Technical information, news, research, and opinion on avalanches, snow safety, and winter backcountry travel.

Monday, November 21, 2016

Thursday, November 17, 2016

What Not To Do

I recently read an accident report about the death of a local skier. The accident report contained a photo showing skin tracks around Kendall Mountain. The skin track is a perfect example of how not to set a track. In fact, it's almost perfect in how it manages to expose the skier to the most hazard for the least gain. There are much safer routes available.

The first problem is that the skin track is unnecessarily exposed to avalanche starting zones. The track's location midway down the hill means that any avalanche that reaches the location of the skin track will have sufficient mass and velocity to knock a skier down and take them for a ride.

Where would this ride take an unfortunate skier?

The skin track is above trees, which are a well-known terrain trap, and the left-most section of the track traverses a small gully that is the perfect location for a deep burial.

I've drawn in an alternate skin track in blue that might work better and has the same number of kick turns. The alternate route through the trees on the right is also a perfect location for a meandering track uphill that wouldn't require any kick turns at all.

Is it laziness? Ignorance? Powder fever?

The skin track is especially interesting in light of the fact that all the downhill routes look pretty conservative!! Note that it doesn't look like anyone wanted to descend the slopes traversed by the track.

It doesn't really add up, does it? Choosing the most dangerous route up and the safest route down.


Seven years ago I wrote a blog post about how to analyze terrain for exposure.

http://avalanchesafety.blogspot.com/2009/12/terrain-observations-increasing.html

The model for terrain analysis I developed ( and still use and encourage others to use ) has the following parameters: Line-of-sight, open, confined, accumulators, obstacles, steep. Let's use the model parameters to analyze the terrain around the skin track:

Line-of-sight. Excellent line of sight. + 1
Open. Yes. -1
Confined. No. +1
Accumulators. Yes -1.
Obstacles. Yes -1.
Steep. Yes. -1.

The grand total?

-2

I never tell people "don't go" because I don't have that view of the world. Just be smart about it.

Monday, November 16, 2015

2015-2016


The 2015-2016 ski season is just about to get started in the Cascade Mountains. I've spent a few evenings out at my Mom's house in North Bend in anticipation of an early day on the snow, but we haven't had enough snow. Maybe the storm tonight will change that.

In the meantime, this is the best article I've ever read in The Avalanche Review. As far as I'm concerned, it's required reading for anyone venturing on the snow.

Risk: Sometimes We're Focusing on the Wrong Action, page 22 by Dale Atkins.

After reading it, I'm sure you'll agree.

Monday, January 26, 2015

Scales of Space and Time

There's a science to walking through windows — The National

We go to the backcountry because it's so easy to inhabit the moment, it's so easy to meditate, it's so easy to feel a thousand miles away when you're just a few miles in.

If you've read through any of the reports about recent avalanche fatalities in Europe, it quickly becomes exceedingly clear that "being in the moment" is just a cliché that people use to paste over short-term thinking and instant gratification.

More info:

http://www.mcnabsnowboarding.com/snowboarding/the-times-they-are-a-changing/
http://www.tetongravity.com/forums/showthread.php/286701-American-Dave-dies-in-avalanche
http://www.powder.com/stories/opinion/jaded-local-hubristics/

Outstanding remarks in the thread at TGR. This commenter really nails it:

"An addiction is seemingly the best way to put it. For most of us there is just so much positive reward stacked up in our brains it's hard to say no sometimes despite the red flags. Combine that with the idea of everyone getting there before you and it's just really strong emotional responses that are triggered.

It seems to me, in my own experience, that the chronically "overstoked", the eternally optimistic among us, are the most vulnerable. The ones most likely to make reality "fit" their preconcieved notions of how things "ought to be" because things look sick and everyone is gettting after it. It may sound negative, but sometimes a little pessimism can keep you safe. Guilty till proven innocent type thinking I guess."

 

Tuesday, November 18, 2014

6 Signs of Exposure

Where am I to go, now that I've gone too far? — Golden Earring

Let's talk about terrain selection for a few minutes. A few years ago I wrote a rather long article on terrain selection, which I followed up with another article that explained the statistical basis for the model. I don't think anyone would argue about the importance of terrain selection, but the simple model of evaluating slope angles isn't quite enough.

With that in mind, I'm going to write a simpler post that discusses the six universal signals of exposure. The benefits of the six universal signals of exposure is that they're easy to use ( regardless of experience ) and they can easily be integrated into trip planning. This means you can evaluate exposure before you set foot on the snow.

The Model
LOCALE. A model for analysing exposure that gives you holistic information about exposure to avalanches.

CriteriaDescription
Line-Of-Sight
  • Is line-of-sight limited?
  • Do local terrain features obstruct your line-of-sight to terrain above or below?
  • Is your uphill view blocked by rocks or trees?
  • Can you see all the terrain above and below or only some of it?
  • Pay attention and double-check your decisions when line-of-sight is limited for any reason.
  • Limitations to line-of-sight can reduce your reaction time to zero. ( I personally feel like this is one of the most important, and overlooked, elements of terrain selection. )
Open
  • Is the terrain open enough to produce small, medium, or large avalanches?
  • Are there open breaks in the forest that allow snow to travel unobstructed to your location?
  • How much open terrain is present and where is the open terrain relative to your location?
  • Large quantities of snow can accumulate in open areas near mountain tops before an avalanche and in valley bottoms after an avalanche.
Confined
  • Is the terrain confined relative to the size or speed of an avalanche of any size?
  • Could a large, fast-moving avalanche overrun the valley floor?
  • Are you in a gully where escape from a small but fast-moving avalanche could prove impossible?
  • Small avalanches form deep deposits in confined terrain, such as hollows or depressions, where snow can accumulate.
  • Estimate your reaction time before something goes wrong and double-check your decisions if reaction time is short.
  • Reaction time is a very important part of your margin of safety because it can tell you a lot about the true degree of exposure for where you plan to travel.
Accumulation
  • Has snow accumulated above or below?
  • Avalanches often start where snow accumulates, and then run downhill where they deposit snow on the valley floor.
ObstacLes
  • Are there obstacles above or below?
  • This includes cliffs, crevasses, rocks, and trees.
  • Obstacles above may block your line-of-sight, inducing hazard blindness, and can cause traumatic injuries during any phase of an avalanche.
  • On the other hand, obstacles can block or redirect flowing snow and may offer protection at your current location.
StEep
  • Is the terrain steeper than 30 degrees?
  • Avalanches start and rapidly accelerate on steep terrain.
  • Steep terrain produces fast-moving avalanches that can release above you and travel toward your location.
  • If you trigger an avalanche on steep terrain, you may be unable to escape from the flowing snow.
  • Steep terrain can limit your line-of-sight, and indicate locations suitable for sluffs, cornice drops, serac fall, or rock fall—all of which can start avalanches above or around you.

Wednesday, November 12, 2014

After All The Ambulances Go


After all this time, and after all the ambulances go — Arcade Fire

Are we putting too much emphasis on human factors?

Or, is the list a bit too short?

Should we expand the list of commonly accepted human factors to include a few unflattering, but honest, additions? I have a friend here in Seattle who is a registered nurse, and a few years ago he clued me in to a wonderful practice called evidence-based medicine. I've been thinking about that for quite a long time now, and I feel like I'm ready to open the discussion.

Powder Magazine has a new series on avalanches. In the first part, they discuss a serious accident that occurred on February 11th, 2014 in the Wallowa Mountains of Oregon. The discussion ends with the now-familiar ( to many ) discussion of human factors. To be honest, after reading the entire article, I was unsure why there was any need to discuss the human factors. The story could just as well have been titled "Pushing Your Luck In Shitty Conditions".

The second incident that I'm going to add is the accident that took place on December 16th, 2013, in the backcountry at Jackson Hole Ski Area in Wyoming. After that accident the survivors had many things to say about what went wrong, and their remarks included comments about additions to avalanche education. If I'd written an article on this accident, I'd have given it the title "The Link Between Incompetence And Death In The Backcountry".

I'm interested in why we so often choose to view avalanche accidents exclusively through the lens of human factors, and if we are going to do this, I am going to propose a few additions: stupidity, laziness, and incompetence. The long and short is that both of these accidents are textbook examples of what not to do, and no amount of education is going to overcome the inertia of laziness, stupidity, and unacknowledged incompetence.

Avalanche education gives participants a foundation with which to develop the scientific and psychological tools to travel safely in the backcountry. Yet you and I both know that many participants fail to follow established best practices, and that many accidents occur as a direct result of such failures. So while it might seem awful to propose adding "laziness", "stupidity", and "incompetence" to the list of human factors, are those words not applicable for backcountry skiers who fail to properly apply their training? Haven't we all walked down that road a few times? Those of us who have been lucky enough to survive should try to remember that it only takes once.

Before this comes across as judgmental or snarky, please allow me to add a few caveats: I'll put myself at the top of the list of people who have gotten themselves into trouble through laziness, stupidity, and incompetence. Second, if we aren't going bother challenging ourselves in this regard, then who will? No, really, if we aren't going to bother challenging ourselves in this regard, then who will? Why should we be afraid to call incompetence what it is, especially if it is our own.

( FULL DISCLOSURE: I was asked by the editor of The Avalanche Review to review the article about the Pucker Face accident. My remarks here are not a result of my participation in that regard. )

Tuesday, November 11, 2014

Snowflakes & Avalanches

It's hard to believe, but I've been nibbling away at this blog for five years now. The last few years haven't had a treasure trove of exciting posts because I've slowly been running out of things that I want to say about avalanches. So if anyone has any good ideas, please get in touch via the information on the About page.

That said, I trust everyone is ready to start skinning in hopes of powder. I'm ready to start skinning whether or not there's anything good to ski down, but I'm content to wait until the rocks are covered. Of course, once the rocks are covered, we have to start worrying about avalanches. So I'm going to wait a little longer and watch videos to help pass the time.

Here's one to get started:

http://backcountrymagazine.com/videos/video-avalanche-engineers/

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

Washington Terrain Ratings

It's the little things that kill—Bush

DISCLAIMER
TRAVELING IN AVALANCHE TERRAIN MAY RESULT IN SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH. THESE TERRAIN RATINGS DO NOT CONSIDER CRITICAL FACTORS RELATED TO AVALANCHE FORMATION SUCH AS CURRENT WEATHER OR THE STRUCTURE OR MECHANICAL STABILITY OF THE SNOWPACK. NONE OF THE TERRAIN RATED IN THIS DOCUMENT IS COMPLETELY SAFE FROM AVALANCHES. THESE TERRAIN RATINGS DO NOT CONTAIN ANY INFORMATION ON CURRENT INSTABILITY NOR ANY FORECAST OF FUTURE INSTABILITY. YOU BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES THAT MAY ARISE FROM YOUR CHOICES.

Terrain Ratings
( AUTHOR'S NOTE: This post was originally written four years ago, but it has been one of my most popular posts, and I thought that it deserved to be featured again. )Most people are familiar with the idea of terrain ratings, but if you are not familiar with the ATES technical model, review the following video:



Introduction
This document contains terrain ratings for ski trips in Washington State. These terrain ratings provide an overall picture of the avalanche exposure for the terrain listed. The author's interpretation of ATES parameters are as follows:
  • The ATES rating system considers avalanche exposure. Other hazards exist.
  • The amount of exposure increases by at least 1 order of magnitude for each rating level.
  • Exposure to avalanche terrain does not increase in a linear manner.
  • Exposure for a simple tour might be viewed as a value of 4.
  • Exposure for a challenging tour is 16.
  • Exposure for a complex tour is 64.
  • In addition many tours have elements of each classification but these ratings are constructed with the entire tour, including the return, in mind.
  • Tours rated challenging are not conservative choices when the danger rating is considerable or higher.
  • Combine these ratings with the current avalanche danger and your personal risk acceptance level.
Simple
Exposure to low angle or primarily forested terrain. Some forest openings may involve the runout zones of infrequent avalanches. Many options to reduce or eliminate exposure. No glacier travel. Choose these trips when avalanche danger is Considerable or higher.
  1. Aiken Lava Bed
  2. Alpental To Source Lake
  3. Amabilis Mountain
  4. Artist's Point
  5. Clara Lake
  6. Hidden Valley Snoqualmie Pass
  7. Hyak Nordic Trails
  8. Diamond Head Road Ski
  9. Diamond Head Trees
  10. Earl Peak Approach via Bean Creek ( Before Climbing To Earl Pass )
  11. Heather Ridge To Skyline Lake
  12. Icicle Ridge
  13. Marble Mountain
  14. Merritt Lake
  15. Mt. Angeles
  16. Narada Falls To Reflection Lakes ( Avoiding the obvious avalanche slope near the parking lot. )
  17. Narada Falls To Paradise
  18. Olympic National Park Lodge Run
  19. Olympic National Park Toilet Bowl
  20. Olympic National Park Waterhole Trail
  21. Olympic National Park Obstruction Point Ridgeline Tour
  22. Olympic Hot Springs
  23. Paradise to Glacier Vista
  24. Silver Basin Flats ( No travel on steep, open slopes around the basin. )
  25. Stetattle Ridge
Challenging
Exposure to well defined avalanche paths, starting zones or terrain traps; options exist to reduce or eliminate exposure with careful route-finding. Glacier travel is straightforward but crevasse hazards may exist. Choose these trips when avalanche danger is moderate.
  1. Alpental To Ridge Above Snow Lake
  2. Cement Basin
  3. Castle / Pinnacle Saddle
  4. Crystal Lake Basin Forested Slopes
  5. Diamond Head Chutes
  6. Eagle Mountain
  7. Earl Peak Approach via Bean Creek, Including Uphill To Earl Pass
  8. Goat Rocks To Treeline
  9. Governor's Ridge
  10. Heather Ridge Backside
  11. Heather Ridge Moonlight Bowl
  12. Hurricane Ridge
  13. Jim Hill Mountain
  14. Jove Peak Approach
  15. Jove Peak South Face Lower Slopes
  16. Kendall Ridge
  17. Lake Stuart
  18. Lichtenburg Mountain North Side
  19. Marmot Pass, To Treeline
  20. Mazama Back Bowls
  21. Mazama Ridge Ski Slopes
  22. Mission Peak
  23. Mt. Catherine
  24. Mt. Margaret
  25. Mt. Roosevelt
  26. Mt. Tamanos
  27. Naches Peak
  28. Narada Falls to Reflection Lakes ( travel up or down the obvious avalanche slope ).
  29. Norse Peak
  30. Paradise To Cowlitz Rocks
  31. Paradise to Panorama Point or McClure Rock
  32. Paradise To Stevens Canyon Via Road
  33. Peak 7828 approach only.
  34. Phantom Trees ( Up to 600 vertical feet / 200 vertical metres below summit. )
  35. Pickhandle Basin
  36. Skyline Ridge
  37. Silver Basin Lower Slopes ( up to the party knoll )
  38. Tunnel Creek ( South side of Cowboy Mountain, Stevens Pass ).
  39. Wedge Mountain, Travel Confined To Ridges, Forested Slopes
  40. Yakima Peak
  41. Yodelin Trees
Complex
Exposure to multiple overlapping avalanche paths or large expanses of steep, open terrain; multiple avalanche starting zones and terrain traps below; minimal options to reduce exposure. Complicated glacier travel with extensive crevasse bands or icefalls. Choose these trips when avalanche danger is moderate or low.
  1. Alaska Mountain
  2. Bacon Peak
  3. Big Slide Peak Summit & North Face
  4. Burroughs Mountain
  5. Butter Creek Drainage
  6. Boston Basin
  7. Camp Muir to Nisqually Bridge
  8. Cannon Mountain Northwest Face via Avalanche Path and Central Colouir.
  9. Cashmere Mountain Summit
  10. Cashmere Mountain Traverse
  11. Chair Peak Circumnavigation
  12. Chair Peak South Basin
  13. Chickamin Peak
  14. Clark Mountain
  15. Colchuck Peak
  16. Colfax Peak
  17. Cowlitz Chimneys
  18. Crystal Lake Basin Open Slopes
  19. Crystal Mountain To Chinook Pass
  20. Cutthroat Pass
  21. Cutthroat Ridge Descents
  22. Dome Peak
  23. Dragontail Peak
  24. Earl Peak Southwest Face
  25. Earl Peak Southeast Face
  26. Earl Peak North Bowls
  27. Eightmile Mountain
  28. Eldorado Peak
  29. Forbidden Peak
  30. Fuhrer Finger
  31. Glacier Peak
  32. Goat Island Mountain
  33. Goat Pass ( Mt. Stuart Area )
  34. Goat Rocks Alpine
  35. Grindstone Mountain
  36. Heliotrope Ridge
  37. Hidden Lakes Peak
  38. Horseshoe Lake
  39. Jack Ridge
  40. Jove Peak South Face From Summit
  41. Lichtenburg Mountain South Side
  42. Lichtenburg Mountain West Side
  43. Lichtenburg Mountain Summit
  44. Lundin Peak
  45. Marmot Pass, To Saddle
  46. Mt. Adams
  47. Mt. Baker Summit
  48. Mt. Buckner
  49. Mt. Howard Summit
  50. Mt. Olympus
  51. Mt. Mastiff Summit
  52. Mt. Maude
  53. Mt. Rainier Carbon Glacier
  54. Mt. Rainier Sunset Amphitheatre
  55. Mt. Rainier Liberty Ridge
  56. Mt. Rainier Summit
  57. Mt. Rainier Glacier Basin
  58. Mt. Rainier Steamboat Prow
  59. Mt. Saint Helens
  60. Mt. Snoqualmie To Summit
  61. Mt. Ross to Davis Peak Traverse
  62. Mt. Shuksan
  63. Mt. Stuart
  64. Mt. Stuart Sherpa Glacier
  65. Mt. Terror
  66. Mt. Triumph
  67. Olympic National Park Klahane Ridge
  68. Paradise to Camp Muir
  69. Peak 7828 To Summit
  70. Ptarmigan Traverse
  71. Pyramid Peak
  72. Red Mountain
  73. Reflection Lakes To Castle Peak
  74. Reflection Lakes To Pinnacle Peak
  75. Rock-Howard-Mastiff Mountain Traverse
  76. Rock Mountain Summit
  77. Ruby Mountain
  78. Sahale Arm
  79. Sarvant Glaciers
  80. Silver Basin Upper Slopes ( to ridgeline or summit of Silver King )
  81. Silver Star Mountain
  82. Sinister Peak
  83. Skidgravel Peak
  84. Slot Couloir
  85. Sylvester Lake
  86. Tatoosh Range Traverse
  87. Table Mountain
  88. Three Fingers Mountain
  89. Tower Mountain Northeast Couloir
  90. Unicorn Peak
  91. Union Creek
  92. Van Trump Park
  93. Vesper Peak
  94. Wedge Mountain, ( Any Travel On East Face )
  95. Whitehorse Mountain
Credits

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Flashlights & Explosions


I don't know what more to ask for, I was given just one wish—Royksopp

I have been writing about avalanches for five years now, and I've done a respectable amount of professional work, all pro bono. Part of that work involves reviewing accident reports for publication, some of it involves avalanche education curriculum, and I do a bit of work involving computer analysis of various things. Every now and again I answer a question from a friend or relative of someone who was killed or injured in an avalanche.

There's something I've noticed that other professionals have noticed as well: the mountains change, the names of the people change, but by and large the accidents are carbon copies of each other. If you've read my blog for long enough, you'll notice that I'm always looking for patterns in piles of data. This is mostly simple process: I'll review literature, with a computer if I have to ( for word counts and semantic analysis ), and I'll ask questions. When all is said and done, I'll think about it, sometimes for a long time, and then I'll arrive at a conclusion. With luck, this conclusion may be useful to others as well.

People have been wondering for a long time if avalanche education makes you more likely to get involved in an accident, and while I don't have a particularly scientific answer to that question, I think it's much fairer to say that the education and training are blamed because they're such easy targets. It's just like sex education ... I mean sex education just teaches teenagers how to have sex, right? So if we stop educating teenagers about sex, the problem will go away. I'm not sure about your politics, but I refuse to let my politics get in the way of my common sense.

In reality, recreational backcountry skiers who are involved in accidents often fail at the most basic of tasks: they choose terrain that is entirely inappropriate for current conditions. Here are some of my ( redacted / additional ) comments for an accident review in which I participated over the past few days.
  • It takes REAL skill and discipline to get the basics right again and again and again.
  • ( You know why? Because the basics are repetitive and dull and pretty fucking boring! )
  • Learning to rigorously apply basics is the heart of skill. Knowing how to do something is not the same as knowing how to do something the right way, but true mastery starts with the basics. If you don't have the basics down, then you're just an amateur, even though it's pretty easy to fool yourself for a long time.
  • But, if you get the basics wrong, pretty much everything else is wrong too, and your knowledge and experience stand a good chance of making things worse. Yeah, knowledge and experience could help... or they might push you closer to the edge. That's really what happens if you get in the habit of ignoring the basics... pretty soon you'll be ignoring more important stuff too.
  • The importance of getting the basics right is well-known in most domains.
  • Everything else is just damage control and/or covering your ass.
The first item is really important. You have to get the basics exactly right, and I don't think you should consider yourself a skillful backcountry skier if you don't know the basics or can't be bothered to apply them. If you skimp on the basics, then everything else is just luck or damage control.

We all know that luck runs out, and damage control ... is for amateurs.

Wednesday, February 19, 2014

Finally, Snow

Here in Seattle we're getting rain and cold, but up in the mountains, it's snowing like crazy.

It can't have escaped most backcountry skiing enthusiasts that dangerous avalanche conditions have been widespread throughout most of Western North America this winter, culminating in 9 deaths in the past 10 days. I don't think this is a matter of education. For starters, if you like free education, there are numerous pages on this blog devoted to terrain, weather, and snowpack, along with musings about the psychology of backcountry safety. There are even free exams.

Anyway, I have been thinking about the recent tragedies, and reading threads on TGR, and wondering what I can add, if anything. I think my contribution will be the following quote, which is attributed to Ian Percy:
  • We judge others by their behavior. We judge ourselves by our intentions.
I'm sure that none of the persons injured or killed in avalanches this year meant to go out and be killed. I'm sure their ski partners were not planning on participating in a backcountry outing that was going to end with a serious injury or fatality.

But this isn't enough. It's so easy to head out into the backcountry and judge ourselves by our intentions, but our intentions are not always as important as our actions. We all have mental pictures of ourselves, sometimes moment-by-moment, and it's incredibly important to make sure that our mental picture ( our intentions ) aligns with our actions when we're making decisions that involve risk.

So, if you're skiing in Western North America, now is probably a very good time to start judging yourself by your actions.

I know I am.

Tuesday, November 26, 2013

Logical Fallacies

This is a great poster for anyone. Backcountry skiers, office workers, people with families and spouses. I especially like the "middle ground" fallacy because I think we're socialised to compromise even when it's not in our best interest to do so.

Why fallacies?

The Avalanche Handbook says that you should study and memorise human biases, as many avalanche accidents are rooted in decisions that were improperly influenced. Think of it this way: if someone put something in your tea, wouldn't you want to know about it?

What if you put something in your own tea and simply forgot?

Here's a link to the full-size version: http://i.imgur.com/OOA8QzF.jpg

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Kenny Rogers

Know when to walk away and know when to run—Kenny Rogers

In light of the recent avalanche at Loveland Pass, discussed here on Teton Gravity Research, maybe avalanche education should focus entirely on teaching people when to walk away. But maybe that's not really enough. Maybe avalanche education already tries to teach people when to walk away.

Maybe avalanche education needs to teach people how to walk away.

Thursday, December 6, 2012

Most Dangerous Equation

I was wondering, will you reach me?—Kylie Minogue

With some of the first great skiing weather of the season, I'd like to present an interesting concept that I found at Princeton University. It's worth reading the longer explanation, but I'm including a shorter version below:

The Most Dangerous Equation ( shorter explanation here ).

From the article:

It is no revelation that humans don’t fully comprehend the effect that variation, and especially differential variation, has on what we observe.

What can we take away from De Moivre? Variations increase as sample size decreases and variations decrease as sample size increases.

Think about this the next time you're evaluating conditions. Like most things related to snow safety, De Moivre's equation works both ways.

Thursday, October 4, 2012

Themes

I'm the weight, you're the kite—Metric

I'm trying to pick a theme for this year. Past themes have included uncertainty and complexity.

Maybe I'll choose psychology.

Anyway, you can look forward to expect a long series of posts while I think about a topics for the 2012-2013 ski season. Feel free to suggest topics if anything comes to mind.

In the meantime, think snow.

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Phrase of the Day

Heart still beating but it's not working, it's like a million dollar phone that you just can't ring—One Republic

Happy Summer!

Found this on a popular social network.

Anyway, I think this image has a pretty nice, simple summary of the cognitive side of avalanche education. Feel free to add your own words...

 

Saturday, April 7, 2012

Unintentional Pseudoscience

As soon as I get my head round you, I come around catching sparks off you—The Jesus and Marychain

This post will probably be unpopular, but I'm going to publish it anyway. I'm sure that I'll lose a few readers, but I'm willing to take that risk in order to say something that I believe is incredibly important.

NWAC and/or Friends of NWAC and/or Huxley College of the Environment ( referred to herein as "NWAC et al." ) recently introduced a feature that allows you to visualise the current avalanche forecast as an overlay on a topographical map. I first saw this feature at the Northwest Snow and Avalanche Summit in November, and I was immediately uncomfortable. Rather than write a post about it last November, I decided to think about it for a while and see if my feelings changed.

They haven't.

Figure 1.1. "Danger Rose" map produced by NWAC et al. Unless asked, I won't post detailed criticism, but I will say that the map is utterly divorced from reality. Look at the huge sections of "moderate" danger. Does anyone really believe that avalanche danger is moderate everywhere indicated by the yellow overlay? If so, when is the avalanche danger moderate? This is a classic case of transforming data from a large scale ( synoptic ) to a much smaller scale ( meso or micro ) apparently without the additional data ( or procedures ) required to perform such a transformation with any reasonable degree of accuracy.




My "understanding" of the avalanche problem is "very advanced". By this, I mean that as my "understanding" has grown over the years, it has become increasingly clear to me that there are many things that can't be known. Perhaps that's why I so often write about uncertainty and complexity.

I recently wrote an email to a researcher who is a colleague of mine. In the email I discussed my travels through the network of avalanche phenomena, and about how uncomfortable it was to realise that many of my old observation tricks rested on empty assumptions. These discoveries made me realise that my record of making "safe decisions" is based in luck far more often than skill. From the email:

Funnily enough, it only took a few videos to convince me that many of the data collection/observation techniques that I've been using in the backcountry are probably very weak, and possibly very dangerous. The inescapable conclusion is that natural phenomena, such as the chaotic interaction of air masses and rough mountain terrain, are complex enough to DEFY our ability to make anything beyond what amount to very simple inferences.

The fact of the matter is that the science of terrain, snowpack, and weather are not nearly advanced enough to allow anyone to create detailed avalanche forecast maps for a large area. NWAC et al. have gone through the motions of at least twice disclaiming the inapplicability of the maps at small scales, even while the map presents the data at small scales. Yes, they've limited the zoom feature, and while I certainly believe that they're trying to do the right thing, the fact of the matter is that the science says this map is dangerous and inaccurate.

I believe that a professor at the Huxley College of the Environment handled the programming, and since I'm not at all sure of his background, I'll keep my comments narrow: the capability to make a map of the avalanche forecast does not mean that it is a good idea, and anyone with a reasonable, working knowledge of the scientific realities of avalanche phenomena should understand why.

Figure 1.2. "Danger Rose" map with single kilometre quadrants. It's very obvious that this map inappropriately presents data at the kilometre and sub-kilometre scales. Each kilometre quadrant is 20x20 pixels, which means that each pixel is 50 metres. 50 metres IS approximately the scale of a single slope. Even though NWAC doesn't allow additional zooming, I think it's fair to say that the danger rose map presents data at the synoptic, meso, and micro scales.

The map CLEARLY shows a synoptic scale forecast that has been inappropriately transformed to the kilometre scale, and possibly to the slope scale as well. Think I'm just being picky? Ask yourself a question: where are the data for each coloured point shown in the map and how were the data generated?

In reality, there's no actual data for most of the points in the map, and the lack of a disclaimer for this "little" fact is misleading AT BEST. Shouldn't the disclaimer say something like "We made this map using data from a variety of computer models and a few weather stations. Even though the map looks complete, we actually have no data for most of the forecast area." That would, at least, be honest.

I feel perfectly comfortable assigning the bulk of the criticism to Huxley College of the Environment. Their logo is featured prominently at the bottom right corner of the map, and they handled the programming. It's Huxley's responsibility to get the science right, and this abject failure rests solely at their feet.



The science of avalanche phenomena tells us unequivocally that such maps cannot be accurate given the current state of the art. I understand the desire to make things easier for people to understand, but this is not the right approach. It's one thing to implement something as an experiment, or even as a tool for professionals, but it is another thing entirely to make it available to the general public, who may not understand the limitations.

As it stands, scientific impossibility relegates this map to the realm of unintentional pseudoscience. NWAC et al. should remove this feature from their web site immediately, and the good folks at Huxley College of the Environment should get a better handle on the science behind avalanche phenomena.

Friday, April 6, 2012

Happy Trails

It's that time of year... time to think about long trips that involve skiing big mountains. I've certainly had less to say this year than in years past, but I hope that what I have written has been useful.

I have one more post for the season, and I'll be publishing it in a couple of days. It probably won't be a very popular post, but I'm not all that concerned with popularity.

Best,

CookieMonster

Monday, February 20, 2012

More Suffering

You gotta know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em, know when to walk away, know when to run—Kenny Rogers

On Sunday, four people were killed by avalanches in Washington State. I won't armchair because it only adds to the suffering for survivors.

But there's another side to the story, and it's that not everyone died. Here's a post from Turns-All-Year in which a local backcountry skier describes their experiences in/around the backcountry near Crystal Mountain Ski Area.

Yesterday was really bad. Condolences.

In the backcountry near Crystal, we triggered two slabs one 80-ft wide with 12 inch crown. No burial. The one strong warning we observed.

Then later triggered a 250-ft wide 24 inch crown. Brought down the whole small (what we thought was mellow angle) bowl, on us as we were skinning up. All of us were buried. Two partial, chest +/- deep. One burial a full 4-ft deep. Beacon and probe and quick (5-6 min.?) uncovering of the 4-ft deep burial saved a life. We all skied out with no major injuries.

A crazy day indeed.

In other posts, I've written that there is a significant difference between experience and skill. Skill means knowing how to do something properly. The tale from Crystal Mountain is a testament to the ugly possibilites that arise when you take a low skill approach to backcountry skiing.

As always, as I've written so often, it's so easy to focus on the physical and kinesthetic aspects of backcountry skiing, but the underpinnings of the sport are almost entirely cerebral.

That's why you have to manage your state of mind.

Now every gambler knows the secret to survin' is knowing what to throw away and what to keep.

Friday, February 3, 2012

The Root of Suffering

Terrain + Snowpack + Weather + Human = Desire * Uncertainty

I've updated my recipe for decisions ( directly above ).

So I'll spare you the long-winded rattle about risk management, because what does all that stuff really mean? If you want the long version, read my Backcountry Recipe Book post. For follow up reading, check out Lynne Wolfe's interview in The Valley Citizen. Lynne is brilliant ( as usual ).

The long and short of it: no matter how we approach the world, it's up to us to proactively manage our state of mind.